

Integrating Negotiation Research with Team Dynamics

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To appear in: B. Goldman and D. Shapiro (Eds.). *The Psychology of negotiations in the 21st Century workplace*. SIOP Frontiers series.

Final version may differ slightly from this draft.

This volume has explicitly positioned negotiation in the complex and challenging world of the workforce. Instead of using the well-worn terms, “negotiation” and “negotiators”, Shapiro and Goldman use the more provocative and rarer terms, “employees” and instead of using the vacuous terms, “situation and context”, they use the much more meaningful terms, “workplace” and “industry”. Similarly, instead of referring to negotiated outcomes, the contributors have referred to contracts (e.g., Malhotra, this volume). In so doing, this important volume has reminded scholars that the study of negotiation outside of the context of organizations, whether it be firms or home business, is quite frankly, not that meaningful to managers.

In this commentary chapter, we reflect upon how negotiation research has been an excellent student, comrade, and proponent of team and group research. We explore the synergistic relationship between negotiation research and team research and suggest ways it may continue to grow and prosper, and we attempt to remain true to the grounding the theme of the volume in the workplace. We use the chapters in this volume to highlight how team and group research has informed negotiation as well as speculate on new vistas for research.

In truth, many or most of the researchers in this volume are aligned with both the field of negotiation as well as group research. Not surprisingly, the theorizing of negotiation scholars has been deeply influenced by group research in social psychology. Our commentary examines how group research has influenced negotiation research and where some opportunities may lie. We use the organizing structure of the volume to guide our selective review of team and group dynamics. Specifically, we first explore fairness and justice in the context of groups and teams, and then examine emotional and affective processing, social influence, and organizational influence.

Fairness in teams and negotiation

The contributors to this volume have provocatively highlighted how fairness considerations may thwart negotiator effectiveness, or at the very least give rise to conflict or inconsistent decision-making. Fairness considerations are an essential aspect of the twin tasks of negotiation: expanding the pie and dividing the pie. Negotiation researchers often admonish managers that even after the pie has been expanded, it must be divided. From a mixed-motivational perspective, the act of dividing or allocating resources has been considered the “competitive” aspect of negotiation whereas the process of expanding the pie has been considered the “cooperative” aspect (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Walton and McKersie, 1965).

Behavioral researchers have identified a disturbingly long list of biases in terms of how individuals make “faulty” fairness judgments. Some of these biases include: egocentrism (e.g., allocating more for oneself than others, cf. Messick and Rutte, 1992; evaluating one’s own contributions as more important than others, Ross and Sicoly, 1979), self-serving bias (van Avermaet, 1974; Allison, Messick and Goethals, 1989); inconsistent use of fairness rules (e.g., equality with friends, equity with strangers, Austin, 1980; equality for benefits, but equity for burdens, Sondak, Neale and Pinkley, 1995), framing effects (Bazerman, Loewenstein and White, 1992); selective recall of one’s own contributions to the exclusion of other’s contributions (Messick and Sentis, 1979), and excessive preoccupation with the payoffs or outcomes of others (van Avermaet, 1974).

Teams and groups are faced with decisions about how to allocate scarce resources and reward members. Not surprisingly, several “fairness” biases have been identified in the groups

literature, including: the in-group bias effect, procedural justice and group value theory, and social utility. We discuss these next.

In-group bias. The in-group bias effect is probably the most well-known group-level bias. It simply states that members of groups regard their own group to be more superior and more worthy than members of out-groups (Kramer, 1991; Wills, 1981). This effect is true even when groups are randomly assigned and formed on the basis of chance (Tajfel, 1970). The in-group bias effect influences not only subjective ratings of one's own and other groups (e.g., my group is superior to the out-group), it also influences allocation decisions. For example, people allocate more rewards to in-group members than to out-group members, even in the absence of any justifying criteria (Diekmann, Samuels, Ross, and Bazerman, 1997).

In a similar vein, research on equity theory in groups and negotiations has revealed that people expect outputs to be commensurate with inputs (i.e. equity theory, Adams, 1963). However, pervasive biases cloud people's perceptions of the relative inputs and outputs of themselves and others. In this volume we discuss the implications of experiences of 'injustice' in negotiations. The authors explain how perceptions of a negotiation counterparty's 'fairness' may lead to more cooperation among parties, and presumably, more integrative agreements (or in some cases, more negotiator compliance). Tying the literature from both the negotiation and organizational justice streams of research, Conlon and Ross present eight justice-enhancing techniques that promote fairness in mixed-motive disputes. Additionally, Conlon and Ross account for a real-world context, in which social networking websites (SNWs) influence perceptions of negotiator fairness. In this vein, the authors address how contemporary avenues

for gaining information (i.e. Facebook pages) affect early perceptions of one's negotiation counterpart.

Similarly, Pinkley (this volume) enumerates negotiation strategies that help both employers and employees achieve 'fair' negotiated outcomes. Pinkley concentrates on compensation, suggesting that current compensation negotiation research should be updated to suit a burgeoning diverse and technologically savvy workforce. The author argues that prior research has concentrated on same-gender negotiating parties, suggesting that beneficial negotiation strategies may differ for women, as opposed to men (i.e. in *anchoring the negotiation*). Furthermore, Pinkley examines differences between online and face-to-face communication, suggesting that virtual communication may affect the utility of classic compensation negotiation strategies. For example, instead of the traditional post-job interview salary negotiation, many companies using online recruitment methods ask candidates to report their salary expectations when they apply. Pinkley explains that a job candidate can avoid the pressure to report a low salary expectation (in an effort to remain competitive with the other applicants) through a sequential anchoring process. That is, an applicant can initially state that her expectations are consistent with the market, but anchor the negotiation with a numerical salary value only after securing the job.

Procedural Justice and Group Value Theory. In their seminal book, Thibaut and Walker (1975) widened the lens of equity theory to not simply focus on outputs per se, but to also consider the manner in which justice is enacted. Thus, Thibaut and Walker distinguished distributive justice from procedural justice. Tyler and Lind and their colleagues provocatively demonstrated that in many cases, disputants and negotiators are much more concerned about how justice is enacted rather than their actual monetary outcomes (Tyler and DeGoey, 1995; Lind and

Tyler, 1988). For example, Tyler (1987) found that disputants' satisfaction in court adjudications was more influenced by whether they believed that the judge had "heard" their case than by the actual judgment handed to them. Similarly, employees who believe they have been mistreated are more likely to exit and exhibit work withdrawal (Boswell and Olson-Buchanan, 2004). The term, "voice" became a key construct measure of whether disputants experienced procedural justice.

Lind and Tyler's (1988) group value model of justice argues that individuals who are strongly identified with their groups and organizations may put aside their own self-interest and act in a way that helps the group. Key to the model is the idea that people in groups evaluate leaders in terms of their ability to be fair and impartial. Thus, the authenticity of the group leader is key.

In this volume, Roloff, Brockner, and Wiesenfeld suggest that negotiators should appear 'authentically fair' rather than just 'fair.' The authors assert that fair outcomes may only seem valuable if they are delivered with intent, or are intrinsically, rather than strategically, motivated. Negotiators may evaluate authenticity by attributing their counterpart's actions to personal or contextual factors, reasoning that a negotiator who is personally motivated has greater congruence between their intentions and actions than a negotiator that is motivated by environmental factors. Finally, the authors note moderating factors in today's work place, mentioning how both physical distance where the counterparts are spatially separated, and psychological distance where the counterparts are culturally separated, may negatively influence perceptions of authenticity in negotiation counterparts.

Social utility. Social utility was introduced as the idea that people are excessively preoccupied with how well others do relative to themselves when a perfectly rational person should only be concerned about his or her own outcomes. This leads to a variety of paradoxical behaviors, such as attaching more value to less money, depending upon how much the other party is receiving.

Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman (1989) compared how much satisfaction people associated with different allocations of money between themselves and others; they found that satisfaction is highest in cases of equal outcomes, but if inequity must exist, they strongly prefer that they benefit relative to others, rather than vice versa. Bazerman, Loewenstein, and White (1992) pitted pure self-interest against social utility by asking manager (negotiators) to indicate which of several salary payoffs they preferred. Manager-negotiators were often willing to accept a lower absolute salary, if that meant that they were not underpaid relative to others. Messick and Sentis (1979) found that people unconsciously select fairness rules in a self-serving fashion; for example when people have worked more hours they believe they are entitled to more than someone who has worked fewer hours, holding constant the amount of work actually done; yet when they have worked fewer hours and accomplished more they expect to be paid more.

Recently, social utility in negotiation research has moved beyond strictly economic measures of utility (such as money and resources) and has focused on other considerations, such as satisfaction. In this volume, Elfenbein and Curhan emphasize the necessity for subjective value measures, above and beyond objective value measures, in negotiations. The author's illustrate the relative importance of subjective value, that is— the overall feelings and sentiments that follow a mixed motive interaction, to common people and negotiation professionals alike.

Furthermore, Elfenbein and Curhan assert that positive subjective value can lead to future objective outcomes, due to the positive relationship between the negotiators. Finally, the authors discuss several factors, i.e. extraverted personality, identifying subjective value outcomes, etc., that can beneficially affect a negotiator's post-negotiation subjective value. For example, Elfenbein and Curhan argue that a negotiator can enhance her counterpart's subjective value by treating the counterpart with respect. A negotiator can signal this respect by asking questions, listening, showing trustworthiness, and making the entire negotiation process efficient.

In sum, research in the area of groups and fairness has revealed that individuals most certainly depart from the prescriptions of economic models. Their judgments tend to be highly self-serving and egocentric. Further, there is a strong link between fairness judgments and behavior.

Emotional and Affective processing in teams and negotiation

Once negotiation broke free of the “*don't feel, don't tell policy*” inherited from the super-rational cognitive information processing paradigm, emotions have become a legitimate area of study in negotiation. Several burgeoning research findings conspired to create a new look at how people make decisions and behave in the face of emotion. A key influence in this area of research was the distinction between two routes to persuasion: the cognitive, rational information processing route and the mercurial, affective route (Chaiken, Wood and Eagley, 1996). Another influence was the research findings on how temporary mood states affect the nature and quality of decision making. From the groups and teams literature, we briefly highlight four affect-based group phenomena and discuss their impact on negotiation research: positive mood effects,

negative mood effects, affective contagion, and relational and task conflict. We then highlight how these four themes emerge in the chapters in this volume.

Positive Mood. Carnevale and Isen (1986) were the first to study the impact of positive mood on negotiation behavior. In their investigation, positive affect was temporarily induced by having research participants read funny comic strips, positive mood led to more integrative agreement than did neutral moods. Recently, Kurtzberg, Naquin, and Belkin (2009) found that beginning an email transaction with humor resulted in increased trust and satisfaction, higher joint gains, as well as higher individual gains, as compared to those who did not use humor. In sum, for quite some time, positive mood was considered to be nearly uniformly conducive for negotiation, in terms of improving outcomes and inducing cooperation from the counter-party.

More recent research focusing on nuances of mood and affect, however, suggest a more complex picture. Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) suggests that anger expressions help negotiators claim more of the proverbial pie when their counterparts have poor alternatives. Individuals who were subject to angry vs. non-angry negotiation counterparts were more concessionary when they felt they had few options rather than many (Sinaceur and Tiedens, 2006). Although positive moods contribute to joint outcomes, negative moods are just as influential to negotiated agreements, especially in a distributive sense.

In this volume, Cropanzano, Becker, and Feldman review the literature on mood and emotion in negotiation, and reason that both constructs weigh heavily on negotiation processes and outcomes. For example, envy may increase the probability that a negotiator will use deception in a negotiation, whereas, guilt, or shame, may lead to more concessionary behaviors. Furthermore, the authors assess the effect of affect on relationships in negotiations, reasoning

that stronger relationship commitments may impact negotiation outcomes. Finally, the authors provide directions for future research, arguing that ‘negative mood states’ should be explored in terms of the beneficial effects they may have on mixed-motive interactions.

Negative mood. Researchers quickly realized that negative or bad moods might have non-obvious effects on negotiation. Negotiators who are really angry and feel little compassion for the counterparty are less effective in terms of expanding the pie than are happy negotiators (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, and Raia, 1997). In contrast, negotiators who display “strategic anger” are more likely to gain concessions from their opponent because the counterparty will assume the angry person is close to their reservation point (Van Kleef, DeDreu, and Manstead, 2004). Angry negotiators induce fear in their opponents and thus, their opponents are more likely to succumb when they are motivated (Van Kleef, DeDreu, and Manstead, 2004).

In this volume, Bies and Tripp also examine a particular type of negative mood, revenge. The authors discuss the ways in which employees seek revenge, while also exploring how organizational managers can implore their workforce to respond more cooperatively. For example, Bies and Tripp explain that when a victim has lower status than her harm-doing counterpart and the level of procedural justice in the organization is high, the victim will be less likely to retaliate with vengeful actions. The authors explain that ‘intentions matter’ and show how revenge partially stems from the assumption that the harmdoer intended to do harm. On a practical note, Bies and Tripp argue that employees should always be explicit about their intentions when communicating sensitive, or emotionally charged information over the contemporary mediums of email or text.

Recently, researchers have moved beyond the simple question of how a particular mood affects the outcome of a negotiation and raised the interesting question of how moods might affect the behaviors of negotiators. Arguably, negotiators who are deceived feel particularly emotional. In this volume, Lewicki and Hanke explore the interesting question of how deception affects a negotiator's self-view (i.e., as a victim of deception) and his or her view of others (i.e., as a perpetrator of deception). They argue that trust is a vital factor in the negotiation process, and that deception diminishes negotiator trust. In this vein, Lewicki and Hanke present strategies that negotiators use to deceive their counterparts. Some strategies are considered marginally ethical but are generally accepted, such as competitive bargaining (i.e. making an inflated opening offer) and emotional manipulation (i.e. faking anger). Other strategies are generally agreed to be inappropriate, such as maliciously defacing an opponent's reputation or using bribery to gather information. The authors also present tactics that counter parts can use to avoid being the victim of deception, including trust and relationship building and asking probing questions to reveal inconsistencies in a counterpart's arguments. Finally, Lewicki and Hanke show how modern day mediums of communication may add or detract from negotiator trust.

Affective Contagion. Contagion models of affect argue that one person's moods can infect those of others. Certain social conditions may augment the impact of moods as well, such as the fact that powerful people are more contagious than are others. For example, Anderson and Thompson (2004) found that positive affect of powerful negotiators shaped the quality of negotiation processes and outcomes more than the positive affect of less powerful negotiators. Powerful individuals' trait positive affect was the best predictor of negotiators' trust for each other and of whether they reached integrative outcomes, and predicted joint gains above and beyond negotiators' trait cooperativeness and communicativeness.

Relational and Task conflict. Jehn (1995) drew a distinction between two types of group-level conflict: affective conflict and task conflict. Behfar, Peterson, Mannix, and Trochin (2008) expanded Jehn's distinction to introduce a third type of conflict: process conflict. Several studies suggested that affective conflict (characterized by negative emotions) was detrimental for negotiation, in contrast fact-based conflict or task conflict was effective (Jehn and Mannix, 2001). However, a ground-breaking meta-analysis of relational and task conflict suggested that both types of conflict hurt group performance (DeDreu & Weingart, 2003). They found that relationship conflict was also highly negatively correlated with team performance; and surprisingly, task conflict was negatively correlated with team performance and team satisfaction.

Social influence in groups and negotiation

Social influence is a timeless topic in team and group research dating back to the famous Asch (1956) and Milgram (1963) studies of conformity and obedience respectively. Cialdini's (1993) provocative book on influence clearly captured the attention of negotiation researchers. The research on social influence has provided an extremely wide-ranging set of studies from which negotiation research has benefited. When we look at the field of negotiation, there are several compelling theoretical and empirical examples of social influence. We discuss the following: power, gender (in terms of status and pseudo-status), and culture.

Power and negotiation. Research on power in groups has yielded a provocative set of findings. Powerful people are less inhibited (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), take more risks (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003), and are more expressive (Keltner, Gruenfeld, Galinsky and Kraus, 2010) than are less powerful individuals. People with higher status make

less accurate judgments about the personality and emotions of others than do low status people (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). In negotiation, power promotes an action orientation. High power individuals are more likely to initiate a negotiation than low power individuals and once in the negotiation, high power negotiators are more likely to make the first move (Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007), which can influence economic outcomes (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Power can also have indirect advantages for negotiators. In high power negotiators, anger produces cognitive focus which allows them to claim more value, whereas low power negotiators lose cognitive focus when angry and claim less value (Overbeck, Neale, & Govan, 2010).

Gender and negotiation. Eagley and her colleagues soberly demonstrated that women are not only accorded less value in groups and teams, but they are devalued (Eagly and Johnson, 1990; Eagly and Karau, 1991). Similarly, Rudman (1998), suggests that there is a backlash against women. Women are penalized for embodying masculine traits, such as agency and dominance. Unfortunately, both of these skills may be necessary for effective negotiation. Kray, Thompson, and Galinsky (2001) borrowed Steele's (1997), implicit stereotyping theory to argue that when gender stereotypes are primed, this negatively affects women at the bargaining table. In a similar fashion, Bowles, Babcock and McGinn (2005) examined "strong" versus "weak" situations in negotiation and found that the greatest gender differences in salaries and economic negotiation outcomes occurred in industries in which the compensation standards were ambiguous. Similarly, women perform better when negotiating on behalf of someone besides themselves.

In this volume, Haselhuhn and Kray provide a thorough review of gender issues in negotiation and discuss why gender differences persist in today's workplace. For example, relative to men, women are stereotyped as warm but incompetent. When female negotiators perform actions inconsistent with this stereotype they are socially sanctioned (backlash effects) more than their male counterparts. Furthermore, the incentive structure and focus on economic outcomes in negotiations favor male stereotypes. They argue that the language commonly used in negotiations (i.e. *negotiating for*, versus *asking for* a higher salary) may serve as "gender triggers" that make gender differences salient. The authors also describe actions that have been proposed to help close the negotiation gender gap. For example, organizational initiatives that emphasize positive female stereotypes (i.e. good listening skills) and actively attempt to reduce prejudice and bias can help minimize gender differences. However, the authors admonish that workplace norms of competition and a lack of discussion of gender issues may minimize the effectiveness of these initiatives.

Culture. Research on culture in groups and teams has also stimulated negotiation research. Culture is treated in terms of a fixed trait as well as temporarily activated. For example, Brett and Okumura (1998) examined culture as a fixed trait when they compared Japanese with US negotiators and found that joint gains were significantly lower in intercultural negotiations, as opposed to intracultural negotiations. Gardner and her colleagues used a priming methodology to temporarily induce an independent versus interdependent orientation in negotiators to activate cultural differences that influence behavior. For example, Seeley, Gardner and Thompson (2007) induced different relationship construals (independent versus interdependent) by having negotiators read a short paragraph. They then examined how negotiators allocated resources in a dispute situation with a narrow (almost non-existent

bargaining zone). They found that in team negotiations, independently-oriented negotiators were more generous and constructive than were interdependently-oriented negotiators.

In this volume, Tinsley, Turan, Weingart, and Dillon investigate how cultural membership-cued stereotypes affect cross-cultural negotiations. They describe three factors that shape how cultural stereotypes affect negotiations and offer strategies for managing them. First, the effects of cultural stereotypes depend on the accuracy of the negotiators' stereotypes. Another factor is the level of ethnocentrism triggered by the cultural stereotype, as ethnocentrism is positively correlated with the negativity of the cultural stereotype. A third factor is the extent to which negotiators behave in a consistent manner with their cultural group stereotype. Negotiators should realize that often times cultural factors interact with the environment to produce inconsistent behavior. To help navigate cross-cultural negotiations, the authors suggest that negotiators learn about other cultures to increase stereotype accuracy, to recognize that a cultural variable can interact with the situational context to produce stereotype-inconsistent behavior, to take a "culture blind" approach and view the counterpart as an individual, and, finally, to adopt a "multicultural" approach to enhance the positivity of cross-cultural stereotypes.

Organizational perspectives in groups and negotiation.

The organizational perspective in many ways holds the greatest promise for negotiation research. Negotiation research has profited in many ways from its strong roots in social psychology's small group and team paradigm. However, because social psychology stops short of social groups larger than a small team, it is the field of sociology and macro organizational

behavior that may very well represent the next frontier of research. We briefly discuss social networks, reputation, technology, and learning.

Social networks. Social networks of organizational actors, embedded in work teams and groups in an organization regularly negotiate. In this volume, Brass and Labianca discuss how social networks research may increase negotiators' power and influence at the bargaining table. For example, negotiators' network centrality, occupation of structural holes, and number of weak ties can all enhance their power and influence. Thus, it is important to recognize social network building as a strategic/motivational factor for negotiators and as an outcome variable in negotiations research. The authors recognize that organizations are becoming flatter and negotiations are increasingly involving cross-functional and inter-organizational participants. Consequently, it is becoming increasingly important for negotiators to consider their bargaining networks.

One of the implications of social network theory for the study of negotiation is that it is often the case that the parties who appear at the negotiation table are not actually those that will take on the ultimate responsibility for honoring the terms of the deal. For example, a negotiated deal may occur between a procurement division of a large company and a key supplier. Ultimately, the managers who use the procured resources may act in ways that are contrary to the terms of the contract. In this volume, Malhotra draws the distinction between the *negotiation* phase, where a negotiated agreement is reached, and the *contracting* phase, where the agreement is codified in a legal document. He observes that many managers leave the deal-making process after the negotiated agreement but before the contracting phase. He argues that lack of managerial participation in the contracting phase is ultimately detrimental because it can result in

a final deal that reflects the economic stipulations of the agreement but not the relational aspects. Inattention to relational considerations may result in contracts that signal distrust through excessive monetary incentives, mask honest intentions with fine print, and create rigid, binding terms that strain the relationship, especially during times of uncertainty.

Reputation. Arguably, it is only in the context of organizations and social networks that reputation is meaningful. Croson and her colleagues examine reputations and find that reputations are built fairly quickly in negotiation communities (Glick and Croson, 2001). They found 4 distinct reputations in negotiation communities: liar-manipulators, tough-but-honest, nice-and-reasonable, and finally, cream puffs. People use tough or manipulative tactics in a defensive fashion with liars and tough negotiators, but in an opportunistic fashion with cream puffs. Anderson and Shirako (2008) tracked the development of reputations among individuals who engaged in multiple negotiation tasks across several weeks. The authors found that on average, individuals' reputations were only mildly related to their history of behavior. However, the link between reputation and behavior was stronger for some individuals than others--specifically, for individuals who were more well-known and received more social attention in the community. In contrast, for less well-known individuals, their behavior had little impact on their reputation. The findings have implications for negotiation behavior among groups and teams in organizations.

Technology. Whereas the common advice is to negotiate face to face, that is often an impossibility in the virtual workplace. Whereas conducting multi-million dollar deals over the internet would have seemed implausible as little as 10 years ago, it is commonplace today. The study of the impact of technology on group behavior spread like wildfire during the past 15

years. Because many of the empirical observations were non-obvious or different from what we know of face to face interaction, this captured the attention of the negotiation community. One of the first studies of technology's impact on negotiation behavior was conducted strictly via the internet among full-time management students (Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, & Morris, 1999). In this study, some students negotiated with another student from their university (in-group member) and some negotiated with a student from a different university (out-group member). Additionally, some negotiators exchanged personal information with the other party, and some did not. The authors found that both membership in a social group and mutual self-disclosure improved the quality of IT-negotiated agreements. When neither common in-group status nor a personalized relationship existed between negotiators, negotiations were more likely to end in impasse. Other studies have found that gender may be a key mediating variable in terms of the quality of negotiated agreements. For example, when females negotiate, their agreements are of higher quality when they have visual contact; however, the opposite is true for males, who reach better agreements in absence of visual contact (Swaab and Swaab, 2009).

In this volume, Agarwal, Viswanathan, and Animesh provide an overview of how information technology (IT) has impacted the landscape of negotiations. Specifically, the authors explore how IT has altered the *transaction costs*, or the costs required to reach a contracted agreement, of three stages of negotiation. In the pre-negotiation, or contact, stage of negotiation IT has substantially lowered costs associated with searching for an optimal transaction partner. This has transformed both the way consumers purchase and the way sellers make markets. For example, online merchants have given rise to the long tail phenomenon, where small-scale sales accumulate into substantial revenue. The impact of IT is also seen at the negotiation, or contract,

stage. Online auctions support distributive bargaining approaches and a vast amount of IT is designed to increase effectiveness of integrative bargaining situations by facilitating organization, communication, and efficiency. In the post-negotiation, or control-related, stage, IT facilitates synchronization to allow each party to fulfill the contract and provides oversight to ensure the terms of the deal are followed. Additionally, electronically mediated conflicts are often more efficiently reducing, saving both parties time and money.

Learning. The investigation of learning and performance over time has made great strides in the last decade of research. For example, Moreland's studies of transactive memory in teams suggest that people develop a shared cognitive system for completing tasks (Moreland, Argote, and Krishnan, 1998). Their now-famous transistor-radio study revealed that holding constant the amount of training that people received, it was the group context that best predicted whether the team would be successful in assembling the radio once the instructions were removed (Liang, Moreland, and Argote, 1995).

Thompson, Loewenstein, and Gentner (2001) used theory from cognitive psychology to formulate a theory of analogical learning and transfer. They found that the ability to transfer concepts learned in one domain or context is quite limited leading to the "inert knowledge problem." By actively comparing two or more examples or cases that illustrate the same concept, the ability to transfer knowledge to a new situation greatly increases. Bazerman, and others extended this research finding by showing that diverse analogical training (training with multiple concepts) is superior to specific analogical training (training with a single concept) in facilitating joint value creation (Moran, Bereby-Meyer, & Bazerman, 2008). Negotiators trained with a contingent contract and a logrolling analogy created more value in a later negotiation than those

trained with two contingent contract analogies. Surprisingly, diverse analogical training enhanced performance on the other integrative issues in the negotiation.

In this volume, Hughes, Enlow, Siegel, and Weiss emphasize that negotiation is an organizational competence, and hence concepts of organizational learning are crucial for enhancing workplace negotiation ability. First, the authors emphasize the importance of capturing knowledge from previous negotiations. Beyond the skills of individual negotiators, this knowledge can include organizationally-embedded knowledge such as how negotiators are managed or how contracts are reviewed. The authors then provide a framework for translating organizational knowledge into practical lessons that can be disseminated across the organization. To determine which aspects of negotiation warrant investments in organizational learning the authors propose using the concept of segmentation, or grouping a population into sub-sets in order to optimally allocate resources and manage relationships.

Conclusion

Negotiation research has blossomed from social psychology's great body of research in group behavior. The team perspective offers several intriguing vantage points for the negotiation scholar, who may be interested in the question of how a team, ostensibly on the same side of the negotiation table allocates scarce resources, or how members of a larger organization negotiate with one another. By examining the negotiator in the workplace, new theoretical questions can be raised and provocative empirical designs may be crafted. To be successful in offering prescriptive advice for the manager in the 21st century workplace, negotiation scholars must continue to conduct theory-grounded research. We have suggested in this review that group research based in social psychology as well as sociology is paramount for the continued success

of the field. Collaborations that combine micro-focus on groups with macro-focus on how those groups are networked will capture the attention of managers as well as help to integrate research within the field.

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