27. Negotiator bandwidth
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INTRODUCTION

Negotiation theory and research is centered on principles and themes that apply across a wide variety of negotiation situations, industries, and domains. Whereas most negotiation researchers would not see a reason to suggest that a negotiator adopt a different strategy for a pharma negotiation versus an insurance negotiation, the managers in these industries most likely would. Here, we use the term "strategy" as it is used in the interpersonal or intergroup bargaining literatures and define a negotiation strategy as the set of tools and tactics that a negotiator utilizes to attain a desired negotiation outcome (Pruitt, 1981; Rubin and Brown, 1975; Walton and McKersie, 1965). In this chapter, we argue that most students of negotiation segment their negotiation lives into domain-specific negotiations (for example, negotiations with real-estate agents, nannies, for cars, for houses, and so on), but that negotiation theory and research believes it is not necessary to do so. Similarly, companies and organizations view their own negotiation domains as requiring fundamentally different skills and strategies to succeed. The manager who works in pharma does not see how there may be meaningful strategic parallels, for example, in a negotiation in the petroleum industry or the insurance industry. Indeed, these managers endorse the value of training, but they believe that training needs to be industry-specific. In this chapter, we argue that when negotiators segment their negotiations into highly situation-specific domains, they miss important opportunities to develop negotiation strategies that apply across many different kinds of situations and that this limits learning and hinders performance.

A key concern held by negotiators, practitioners, and researchers in the field of negotiations is learning. Ideally, learning allows a person to practice a fundamental skill or strategy in one domain or practice situation and then apply it at the right time in another. As a simple example, consider a student learning math principles associated with division. Suppose the teacher provides study problems that involve story-like problems involving M&M candies and cookies. Later, the same student is at a pizza party and needs to divide the food evenly. Most people would argue that the principles learned in the stories involving treats would be relevant for the pizza problem. Even more far afield might be a division problem concerning the payment of a tax debt or conversely, a lottery win. Again, most people would argue that the domain itself is largely irrelevant and the fundamental principle of division (in this case) is robust across such diverse domains. In this chapter we essentially make the same argument with regard to negotiation skills and strategies.

In this chapter, we refer to "negotiation bandwidth" as the ability of negotiators to use strategies across a wide range of negotiation situations. Negotiators with greater bandwidth are able to see meaningful parallels across negotiation domains. We review and discuss research and practical applications regarding the challenges of increasing

negotiator bandwidth. In so doing, we consider three errors of bandwidth, which we refer to as domain myopia, the self-preoccupation effect, and the script hijack effect. Domain myopia is the faulty tendency to not see parallels across situations, when such parallels actually exist. This is typically a bias of information encoding and processing during initial learning stages. The self-preoccupation effect is a related, but different phenomenon. It is the tendency for negotiators who are embroiled in a negotiation situation to become so involved that they lose perspective, cannot think clearly, and fail to see parallels to relevant negotiations. In these situations, a negotiator's affective and emotional states consume cognitive resources and bandwidth, leading the negotiator to act on emotion rather than cognition. The script hijack effect is the tendency for negotiators to feel compelled to follow a script, often based on stereotypes, when in a negotiation. For example, a car buyer might feel compelled to rely on a highly scripted stereotype when buying a car that may not serve him or her well. Among other things, we argue that the very word, negotiation, leads to fundamentally different perceptions and behaviors than would the same situation under a different name.

Whereas each of the three bandwidth errors shares a common consequence (that is, the inability to use negotiation strategies across situations), they originate from different mechanisms. Domain myopia is a purely cognitive learning error that results from biased information encoding and processing. The self-preoccupation effect is an error driven by emotion and affect, which consume cognitive resources and influence subsequent thought and behavior. The script hijack effect results from strong situational influences, occurring when thought and action are dictated by the scripts evoked in strong situations. For each of these biases, we review research and literature on how this bias manifests itself in negotiator judgment and behavior, the conditions that may mitigate or possibly exacerbate the bias, and how to prevent negotiators from falling prey to the bias.

DOMAIN MYOPIA

Domain myopia is the faulty tendency for negotiators to fail to see parallels across situations, when recognizing such parallels would provide meaningful insight and guidance. Thus, the sales manager in office products might fail to see a parallel between her negotiations with a key customer and a negotiation with a neighbor. In this section, we provide an empirical example of domain myopia, draw a distinction between deep and superficial structure and then discuss the inert knowledge problem and false transfer effect. We discuss methods for minimizing these threats.

One of the first empirical demonstrations of domain myopia was a simple cognitive psychology experiment. In their groundbreaking studies on analogy, Gick and Holyoak (1980) presented students with the "tumor" problem. In this problem, a doctor attempts to treat a patient with an aggressive tumor that requires radiation. The problem is that the dose of radiation needed to eradicate the tumor would also destroy surrounding healthy tissue and organs. A weaker radiation would not be sufficient to destroy the tumor. Most people fail to elegantly solve this problem—only 10% (Gick and Holyoak, 1980). Even when the tumor problem is preceded by an analogous problem ("the general and the fortress problem," in which an army of troops needs to capture an evil general

that is holding a fortress hostage), people have a difficult time seeing the connection (when one problem is preceded by the other, still only 30% solve it) (Gick and Holyoak, 1980). The inability to see the parallels between the two cases and solve the problem is known as the "inert knowledge" problem (Whitehead, 1929). In short, people have the knowledge, but it remains inactive, inaccessible. This knowledge transfer problem has also been replicated using other stimulus materials, usually focusing on recall. For example, in one study, students read one-paragraph stories and then later were presented with different brief stories that either shared the same underlying principle or shared the same surface structure, but spoke to different principles. For example, people who read, "curiosity killed the cat" are more often reminded of "when the cat's away, the mice will play" because of the surface similarity, when in fact, "don't open Pandora's box" is a more meaningful match (Gentner et al., 1993).

Surface Structure and Deep Structure

In the example above, it is meaningful to distinguish two types of similarities among problems or cases: surface structure and deep structure. The surface structure of a problem includes the superficial information and other irrelevant information (for example, the fact that the name of the tumor patient is George or that one of the roads leading to the fortress is named Gateway). Because such information is irrelevant for solving the problem, it is considered surface structure. Unfortunately, research on memory and cognition reveals that, when learners encode a new problem or new information, they often store or encode the problem using such superficial information. Thus, when later attempting to retrieve information, people are often reminded of information that bears superficial similarity, rather than deep similarity. This regrettable phenomenon is called false transfer or faulty reminding (Gentner et al., 2009).

Conversely, the deep structure of a problem concerns information that is meaningful and relevant for solving a problem; such as the fact that the tumor is like the evil king, and the troops that march down the roads leading to the fortress are like the radiation that is directed toward the tumor, and so on. One of the reasons why the inert problem exists is that people fail to see parallels or deep similarities and thus, cannot use such principles during encoding when the memory trace is built. For example, in one investigation, students were asked to sort physics problems into different categories (Chi et al., 1981). Novices tended to sort the problems using surface features (for example, friction, rotational things, blocks on inclined planes); conversely, more expert students used deeper, structure features (for example, law of conservation of energy, Newton's second law, momentum principles, and so on). This use points to a critical difference between how experts learn and how novices learn. Experts focus on deep structure and meaningful similarities. Conversely, novices tend to focus on superficial similarities, because they don't fully understand the deep structure. We find that many novice negotiators often do the same thing.

Novices often fall prey to faulty transfer. Bereby-Meyer et al. (2004) investigated transfer in negotiation teams. Specifically, they examined high learning teams (those with learning goals, high learning values and team discussions) versus low learning teams (those with performance goals, but low learning values and no team discussions) in a negotiation task with integrative potential. High learning teams performed better than

did low learning teams in the second transfer task when the conditions changed, suggesting that the high learning teams were more adaptable. Moreover, negative transfer was observed in the low learning teams, who actually performed worse than teams with no experience at all.

Learning: Experience, Expertise, and Comparison

The initial instinct for improving learning in negotiation was to simply give negotiators more experience (compare with Bazerman et al., 1985). However, experience does not easily transfer to novel-appearing negotiations. Another solution for combatting the inert knowledge problem and its complement, the faulty transfer problem, is to gain expertise (as opposed to mere experience). However, researchers agree that it takes 10,000 hours of careful study and practice before one can become an expert (Gladwell, 2008). Whereas researchers may have allocated ten or more years to read and study negotiation theory, most managers have not. Thus, researchers have attempted to find a shortcut for solving the inert knowledge problem. One elegant and powerful solution is structure-mapping theory (Gentner, 1983; Gentner and Markman, 1997). According to Gentner (1983), if learners are asked to compare two or more examples that all share the same deep structure, but whose surface structure differs across examples, this will prompt the learner to see a consistent parallel across situations that are problem relevant. Conversely, trivial superficial information won't appear consistently across situations and thus, will not be stored in the learner's memory trace. In our research program, we used structure-mapping theory to create negotiation cases that each had varying surface structure (pharma, sharecropping, insurance, and so on), but that all had similar underlying structures (Gentner et al., 2009; Loewenstein et al., 1999; Thompson et al. 2000). We reasoned that if we prompted negotiators to actively compare these situations: (1) the surface features would not be consistent across the problems, and therefore, the irrelevant surface information would fade; and (2) the underlying message would be consistent across problems, and therefore, the meaningful deep structure of the problems would stand out. Thus, the negotiators would better understand the key principle involved.

Inert Knowledge Problem and False Transfer in Negotiation

In our research on analogical reasoning, we found that negotiators fall prey to two key errors of learning, the inert knowledge problem and false transfer. Saloman and Perkins (1989) make a related distinction between low-road versus high-road transfer. Low-road transfer involves an automatic transfer of highly practiced skills with little need for reflective thinking. Conversely, high-road transfer depends on mindful abstraction of knowledge. In our initial investigation, we presented novice negotiators with two cases that differed in surface structure but had identical deep structure (Thompson et al., 2000). One group was told to find the similarities between the two cases; the other group was simply told to read the cases and analyze them. It is important to note that nothing prevented this group from spontaneously comparing the cases. We found that the group who was specifically coached to compare the two cases performed better a week later when given a completely different case to negotiate. The results of this study allowed us

to conclude that actively comparing cases at the time of learning dramatically improves performance on novel problems. In terms of the inert knowledge problem, negotiators who compared two or more cases that had the same deep structure were able to largely minimize and avoid the inert knowledge problem—their knowledge was more portable. Further, they did not fall prey to false transfer—blindly applying knowledge that was irrelevant.

Types of Comparison

Given the powerful effects that comparison seemed to have on negotiator performance and learning, subsequent research has examined the nature of comparison. Several insights have been discovered, not the least of which is that, left to their own devices, negotiators do not appear to draw comparisons across situations even when they are printed on the same page (Thompson et al., 2000). Similarly, merely providing abstractions (or takeaways) of case materials is insufficient to combat the inert knowledge problem (Gentner et al., 2009). Rather, the learner has to do the hard work of engaging in mental comparison. It is important to note that, in our investigations, we focused on a relatively specific negotiation skill, called the contingent contract principle. In this particular negotiation strategy, negotiators are able to craft win-win solutions by developing an if-then proposal in which their present differences are put to the test in the future (see Bazerman and Gillespie, 1999, for a fuller treatment of the contingent contract principle). There are other even more well-researched skills of negotiation, such as logrolling and finding compatible issues, that are central for effective negotiation.

In a powerful compendium of studies, Moran et al. (2008) examined the level of specificity of analogy training. They argue that specific analogical training, wherein negotiators draw analogies between different cases involving the same strategy, are effective for learning and transferring specific negotiation strategies, but that it can be enhanced by considering the breadth of the negotiation concepts that are learned. Thus, Moran et al. (2008) distinguish specific analogical training from diverse analogical training, wherein negotiators compare several different value-creating strategies and show that diverse analogical training is more effective for learning a broad set of value-creating principles. Moreover, negotiators who received diverse analogical training transferred their skills to a novel task and improved their performance on a variety of value-creating strategies, including some that were not previously trained.

Spector (1995) distinguished among four types of analogical reasoning in his study of how people suggest innovative strategies for intractable conflicts: direct analogies, fantasy analogies, personal analogies, and symbolic analogies. Spector (1995) compared participants who were trained using these different types of analogies to those who were trained in using another problem approach, thereby contrasting the use of analogies to distance oneself from a problem versus doing just the opposite by analyzing a given problem in great detail. The results revealed that those in the analogical distancing condition reached agreement twice as often as those in the analysis condition. In addition, those in the analogical distancing condition showed greater goal flexibility in approaching the intractable negotiations.

Reflective Learning and Future Learning

In a more recent investigation, we wondered whether negotiators who compared cases would also be at an advantage in terms of leveraging previous learning (Gentner et al., 2009). This would be the equivalent of asking whether learning something in the present would actually help that negotiator use previously acquired experiences in a more profitable fashion. In this study, we examined highly motivated learners who were engaged in professional education and had 15 or more years of work experience. Half compared two cases; half read the same two cases without being asked to compare them. Then, all were asked to recall an example from their own work experience that illustrated the key principle. The group who actively compared the cases retrieved better examples from their own past experience and performed better than did the group who read the cases. This suggests that the cognitive act of comparing cases, problems, and experiences not only best positions a negotiator to perform in the future, but also make more sense of their previous negotiations. It is worth noting that the act of comparing cases and problems is key to deep learning; merely providing negotiators with generalized abstractions is not effective (Gick and Holyoak, 1980; Nadler et al., 2003).

In subsequent research, Idson et al. (2004) studied the learning-by-analogy effect in a specific decision-making problem, the acquiring of a company problem (Samuelson and Bazerman, 1985). In this problem, a protagonist must decide whether (and how much) to offer to buy a company that is valued anywhere between $0–$100/share (all values equally likely) with the understanding that, whatever its value, it will be worth 50% more under the buyer's ownership. The normatively correct answer is to bid $0 (for a full discussion of this bias and the normative solution, see Samuelson and Bazerman, 1985). Idson et al. (2004) use a variant of analogical training in which participants read and understand differences in decision problems that have different surface structure—for example, the Monty Hall Game (Friedman, 1998; Nalebuff, 1987) and the multiparty ultimatum game (Messick et al., 1997; Tor and Bazerman, 2004). Whereas the surface structures of these problems are quite different, the underlying (deep) structures have parallels. Participants who read and study such deeply analogous problems improve their decision making in the acquiring of a company problem.

Summary

In sum, the literature on analogical learning in negotiation has revealed that negotiators, like most social perceivers, use their past experiences when attempting to solve novel-appearing problems. People clearly feel that they can and should use their previous experiences and abstractions from those experiences to help them solve new problems. Spector (1996) argues that metaphorical reasoning offers negotiators new perspectives on familiar or unusual ideas. Metaphorical or analogical reasoning is the process of using one concept, example or story to guide thinking and analysis on a new problem. For example, when Johannes Kepler developed a theory of planetary motion, he used lodestones as a metaphor (Gentner et al., 1997).

Unfortunately, people rely heavily on surface similarity when solving problems. We have argued that, to be effective, negotiators need to rely on deep, or structural similarities. We have further argued that the nature of initial encoding sets limits on what nego-

tiators are able to recall and retrieve at a later point in time. Deep, structural encoding cannot be achieved by merely telling negotiators what the principle is. Rather, the key involves active comparison of two more examples (instances) that involve similar deep structures. However, it is not sufficient to merely give negotiators several examples, rather, negotiators need to be asked to compare the examples and derive a key principle.

In terms of prescriptive application, it is important to note that some researchers have developed computer-based programs that do the work of retrieving appropriate analogies, which is a key shortcoming of naive and even experienced negotiators (Gentner et al., 2009). For example, Simoff et al. (2009) developed an automated mediation agent, MediaThor, that integrates information revelation and analogical reasoning. Specifically, MediaThor uses past experiences and information from the negotiating parties to mediate disputes and change the positions of the negotiating parties.

THE SELF-PREOCCUPATION EFFECT

The self-preoccupation problem is the tendency for negotiators who are embroiled in a negotiation situation to become so involved that they lose perspective, react emotionally, or fail to think clearly. There are both normative and affective aspects to this problem. In a normative, or value-driven, sense, when the spotlight is on a negotiator in a personally relevant negotiation, the negotiator experiences a heightened awareness or concern for how he or she is being perceived (see Zajonc, 1965). Norms that govern how people should or should not react are especially influential to the negotiator, and the negotiator will often conform to these societal rules rather than the tactics that can promote the most beneficial negotiated agreement. Furthermore, negotiations that involve personally relevant and emotionally charged issues disproportionately consume cognitive resources (Kray and Gonzales, 1999). In a sense, negotiators can become so involved in their situation that they lose perspective and do not think clearly. That is, they lose negotiation bandwidth.

In this section, we discuss how self-preoccupation, or a concern for one's own image and the relational aspects of a personally relevant negotiation, may impede a negotiator's ability to explore the best negotiation strategies. First, we will show how value-based negotiation issues can preoccupy a negotiator, such that the negotiator neglects rational negotiation strategies. Specifically, we will show how compartmentalization of issues into personal and professional domains can limit a negotiator's negotiation strategies within each domain. Finally, we will discuss how emotion and anxiety over a personally relevant negotiation may impede cognitive reasoning, and therefore, recognition of ulterior options and negotiation styles.

Value-Based Issues

When a negotiator is involved in an intense negotiation, the negotiator will strive to protect the integrity of his or her character based on societal norms. The negotiator will especially conform to societal values when the structure of the negotiation is presented as a social or familial issue (negotiating relationship terms) rather than a commonly negotiated issue (buying a used car). According to relational theory (Fiske, 1991;

Fiske and Tetlock, 1997), humans strive to compartmentalize issues into four different incompatible domains (market pricing, communal sharing, authoritarian ranking, and equality matching) so that they can appropriately respond to the issue. In the market-pricing domain, different goods and items are made commensurable through ratios and tradeoffs. For example, the ratio for bananas is 10 to 1; such that you can you trade 10 bananas for 1 dollar (at 10 cents each). In the communal-sharing domain, it is understood that certain items are to be shared by communities of respectable citizens. Moreover, clear air, water, and mutual respect should be shared among people at no fee to any of the community members. In the authoritarian-ranking domain, hierarchical authority is accepted (that is, a military commander is allowed to be more important than his subordinate), and in the equality-matching domain, the norm of reciprocity or tit-for-tat is key (that is, you are allowed to defend yourself and hit someone, if you were hit first).

Because most commonplace negotiations are economic (that is, buying a used car, negotiating a salary), negotiations are commonly associated with the market-pricing relational schema. Intuitively, this makes sense. In actuality, a negotiator is usually bargaining for a certain ratio with a counterpart (that is, "you take 1 slice of the pie, and I take 3 slices") and substantiating that ratio by commensurating goods (that is, "I deserve three-fourths of the pie, because I did three-fourths of the work"). However, when negotiations present themselves outside of a familiar negotiation context—among friends or family, rather than business partners—negotiators often normatively resolve their issue in an equality-matching or communal-sharing, rather than market-pricing, domain (Fiske, 1991). Thus, there are a variety of subjective concerns (above and beyond economic concerns) that factor into the way people negotiate (see Curhan et al., 2006).

For example, in the ultimatum game, an offerer is asked to divide a sum of money between herself and an offeree. The offeree can either choose to accept or reject this portion of the money. If the offeree accepts, the offerer gets her portion of the money, and the offeree gets the portion of the money that she was allotted. If the offeree rejects, neither of the parties gets any of the money. Based on economic and negotiation principles, it is always to the offeree's advantage to accept the offer. Even if the offeree was allotted $5 out of a total sum of $100 (meaning that the offerer allotted $95 for herself), negotiation tactics show that the offeree should take this deal because she gains $5 more than she had before. However, many experiments show that offerees often reject ultimatum deals (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1995). For the offerees, the situation is more analogous to an equality-matching, rather than market-pricing, domain. The norm of reciprocity is so strong in ultimatum games, that offerees will often not take less than a 50–50 split of the total sum (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1995). Furthermore, when they feel like they have been snubbed by their counterpart by receiving a less than an equal share, they feel they are justified in employing tit-for-tat strategies to hurt their opponent (by rejecting, the offerer is denied the money as well). Structurally, the ultimatum game was related to an equity-based schema, so equity-based values prevailed over market-based negotiation tactics.

Furthermore, issues that are usually governed by communal-sharing values are morally prohibited from entering the market-pricing domain. Just the mere use of market-pricing instruments (tradeoffs) with familial, or sacred, issues can appear to be morally reprehensible. Fiske and Tetlock (1997, p. 256) define a sacred value as "any explicit mental

comparison or social transaction that violates deeply held normative intuitions about the integrity, even sanctity, of certain forms of relationship and of the moral-political values that derive from those relationships." For example, because people believe that organs should be communally shared through donations, a legitimate market for organs was deemed to be morally reprehensible. Moreover, because parenthood was declared to be a sacred bond that is communally shared by willing partners, a legal market for surrogate mothers to carry unborn babies was also declared to be morally reprehensible (Tetlock et al., 2000).

Although these examples are on the extreme ends of quotidian negotiations, it shows that issues that are normally governed by communal-sharing or equality-matching schemas are often not negotiated. However, the decision not to negotiate important issues often produces suboptimal outcomes for parties that could have otherwise arrived at beneficial agreements. For example, consider the case of a working mother who drops her child off for a week with a relative to attend an out of town conference. The mother is personally interested in the well-being of her child while she is away. Although the relative is less financially stable than the working mother, the relative agrees to care for the child while the mother is away because family care is a communally shared obligation. Thus, the relative and working mother find that it is inappropriate to broach the topic of compensation for this particular situation because they don't want to offend the other party (offering or asking for money would be an emotionally insensitive topic). Upon the mother's return from her conference, she discovers that her daughter has had to walk through very dangerous neighborhoods to get to and from school. The mother assumed that the relative would drive her, but the relative assumed the child could walk in order to save gas money. If the working mother and her relative had attempted to negotiate a deal, they would have revealed more information about their options (the mother could afford to provide money for gas, the relative could not afford to drive due to gas prices), and they could have reached an agreement that was mutually advantageous (the daughter would be safely driven to school, the relative would have more gas for her car). Instead, they both left unhappy because a market-pricing tradeoff was vehemently opposed.

Further, the compartmentalization of issues into domains determines the behaviors that are acceptable for dealing with those issues. Communal behaviors (that is, sensitivity, warmth, and patience) are appropriate for issues that fall into the communal-sharing domain, and dominant behaviors (that is, assertiveness, diligence, and persistence) are often crucial to success in the market-pricing domain. When negotiators are self-preoccupied and negotiations are "too close to home," the issues may pertain to family or friendships, which fall into the communal-sharing domain. Although assertiveness, diligence, and persistence are instrumental to beneficial negotiated agreements, it is the norm for negotiations with friends to be dealt with using communal behaviors (Mnookin et al., 1996).

Ames (2008) showed that the willingness to be assertive was guided by the negotiator's fear of disrupting the social harmony with the negotiation partner. There is a curvilinear, inverted "U" relationship between the level of assertiveness and positive outcomes, such that low and high levels of assertiveness produce lesser beneficial outcomes than moderate levels of assertiveness (Ames and Flynn, 2007). However, assertiveness is only instrumental to positive outcomes to a point (the apex of the curve). After the threshold,

assertiveness begins to become threatening and extremely damaging to the negotiated outcomes, and the relationship with the negotiation counterpart. Negotiators navigate through negotiations via assertiveness expectancies—that is, displaying only a level of assertiveness that they *expect* will be instrumental, but not damaging, to the social relationship.

In dealing with friends or family, communal behaviors, rather than dominant behaviors, are the norm. Thus, a negotiator *expects* that a family member will have a lower threshold for assertiveness than would a business counterpart. Assertiveness expectancies may lead negotiators, who are concerned about damaging a social relationship, to mute their assertiveness when negotiating with friends (Ames, 2008). Furthermore, these negotiators fail to realize that most counterparts, friends, or strangers, have a higher tolerance for assertive behavior than they would expect (Ames, 2008). Thus, negotiators fail to display a level of assertiveness that can be instrumentally beneficial for negotiated agreements.

In this section, we showed how a negotiator might feel that personally relevant negotiations are governed by emotional and communal, rather than economic, norms. We also showed how concern for personal relationships might impede a negotiator's ability to negotiate in the most effective way. In the next section, we specifically look into how emotional responses can hinder a negotiator's ability to approach a negotiation in the most effective manner.

Emotion-Based Issues

Emotions can also thwart a negotiator's deliberate and rational strategies. As an extreme example, take the case of a negotiation involving ransom or blackmail. When a person is negotiating against the threat of a loved-one's life or a soiled reputation, emotional responses often trump traditional negotiation tactics. According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist approach, emotional, quick, and instinctive judgments may naturally precede rational forms of reasoning. Thus, in the former example, the negotiator may instinctively decide that it is moral to save the loved-one's life by paying the ransom, and then rationalize reasons to support his decisions post hoc. Therefore, any rational decision regarding the best way to handle the negotiation occurs in support of the emotional decision, and only after the emotional decision has been made.

Further still, when a decision is personally relevant, we may make our decisions more intractable and complex than they have to be. Kray and Gonzales (1999) showed that when we are making a decision for ourselves we consider more options, attributes, and factors than when we are advising someone else. This plethora of factors and options could lead to emotional anxiety and suboptimal outcomes (Kray and Gonzales, 1999). For example, Kray and Gonzales (1999) cite the extreme example of an abused wife. When she considers her decision to stay or leave her abusive husband, she considers her safety, future financial stability, her emotions, and her children, among a host of other factors. Consequently, she agonizes over her complex decision, and is paralyzed by all of the very different important factors pulling her each way. However, when a friend advises her, the friend concentrates on the most important factor—safety. Thus, the decision to leave is a swift and easy decision for the friend.

Further, when decision makers are told to intently consider various factors of their

options, they often make suboptimal decisions (Wilson et al., 1990). In a study that explored the relationship between contemplating over options and choosing the best option, decision makers who contemplated the many factors and attributes of their options before making a choice, regretted their choice three weeks later (Wilson et al., 1990). When they were told to consider all of the options, they dismissed gut reactions in favor of a more calculated choice. However, they later realized that their gut reaction, rather than their calculated decision, would have led to a better decision.

Pedagogically, negotiators learn tactics by analyzing cases that prompt them to advise protagonists in certain situations or from class simulations where they negotiate against classmates in fictional situations. Decisions that are made in classroom or textbook negotiations aren't as personally relevant to the negotiator, so negotiation students may swiftly base their decisions on the factor that seems most important, or prominent, to the negotiation. Furthermore, negotiators may not get as much practice dealing with the paralyzing confusion inherent in personally relevant negotiations with multiple factors, when they are actually learning and practicing negotiation techniques.

For example, if a negotiator is reading a case about a negotiation for a used car, the negotiator may attempt to bargain for a lower price when negotiating against a classmate, because the price is listed as the most important factor for the protagonist of the case. However, according to Kray and Gonzales (1999), when that negotiator actually goes to purchase a car, the decision will seem more significant and a variety of different factors (that is, the opinion of the negotiator's spouse, the negotiator's color preferences, and loan options) will matter. In sum, the scripted case cannot possibly contain all factors that could be personally relevant to a given negotiator (see the next section for the script hijack effect), and the negotiator will only really deal with anxiety related to having multiple choices when he or she is actually in the negotiation.

Perspective taking—cognitively considering the world from another's viewpoint (Galinsky et al., 2008b)—may help negotiation students practice dealing with the multiple factors that a case protagonist might experience without dealing with the anxiety and emotionality that weighs a negotiator down. In the same vein, perspective taking, rather than empathy, is associated with the ability to create and claim resources at the bargaining table (Galinsky et al., 2008b). Empathy—the ability to connect emotionally with another individual—could presumably produce the negative angst related to choice anxiety.

Summary

In sum, the self-preoccupation problem affects negotiators by putting a spotlight on them; it increases their awareness of how they are normatively perceived by friends, family, and other important observers. When negotiators begin to follow norms, rather than negotiation tactics, they begin to react emotionally to satisfy observers' expectations of them. Sacred values become important, such that when dealing in communal-sharing (friends or family) or equity-based (norm of reciprocity) domains, market-pricing trade-offs (negotiations) become vehemently opposed. Communal behaviors are preferred to more assertive behaviors in distributive negotiations with personally relevant counterparts, and negotiations aren't even broached if assertive behavior is deemed to be counter-normative for a person of a certain social group (that is, women).

Further, emotional responses directly impede the cognitive processing needed to arrive at the best strategic decision. Quick and instinctive affective judgments often precede any deliberate or rational decision-making process. A personally relevant negotiation can also increase the number of issues that a negotiator sees, thereby making dynamic decision making complex and intractable. This increase in issues can cause emotional anxiety, leading dynamic decision making to become lengthier, confusing, and paralyzing to the negotiator.

THE SCRIPT HIJACK EFFECT

Imagine two negotiations, one with a car salesman and one with a spouse. These two situations tend to evoke different images. Negotiations with car salesmen are often perceived to be one-shot and zero-sum, with each party focused on claiming the most value (Raiffa, 1982). On the other hand, negotiations with spouses are replete with negotiation history and expectations for the future, with each party focused on the long-term goal of preserving the relationship.

As the above example illustrates, negotiation contexts often come with expectations about how a negotiation should unfold. We refer to the expectations about which behaviors are appropriate in a given negotiation context, as a "negotiation script." Whereas our script for a used car negotiation dictates that we should be aggressive and prioritize claiming value, our script for a marital negotiation dictates that we should be accommodating and prioritize relationship maintenance. Negotiations in a number of different domains (for example, car, house, job) are often highly scripted and negotiators enter them believing they should interact in a specific way. At times scripts can be useful to follow. But we argue that adherence to a particular script reduces flexibility and the likelihood that a negotiator will apply useful, albeit script-inconsistent, strategies across negotiation situations. Scripts predispose negotiators to rely on stereotypical advice and expect specific types of interchanges. Strict adherence to a script is a form of myopia that hijacks negotiation bandwidth. We call the tendency for negotiators to over-rely on a script when in a negotiation the script hijack effect.

In this section we will first define the concept of a negotiation script and explain how they contribute to the script hijack effect via strong situations. Next, we will discuss the origins of script hijack, highlighting how scripts are rooted in social norms. Then we will touch upon the power of labels in activating negotiation scripts. Finally, we will consider how to prevent and to counteract script hijack.

Negotiation Scripts

Generally speaking, a script is a set of expectations that one has about a given type of situation (Abelson, 1981). Once a script is activated, it guides the way people organize and make sense of new information. For example, activation of the "restaurant" script activates a number of expectations about food preparation, waiter service, and ordering from menus. These expectations exert powerful influence on our judgments of what is appropriate and the likelihood that we will engage in different behaviors (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Negotiation scripts represent a negotiator's expectations about how a

negotiation should unfold. An example of a negotiation script is the "used-car nego-tiation" script. The average used-car negotiation is isolated, one-shot, and single-issue. This means that there is only minor concern with one's reputation or with building a relationship, and there are typically no opportunities for creating value. Under these circumstances, car buyers are advised to bargain aggressively and focus solely on claim-ing as much value as possible. Thus, when the used-car negotiation script is activated, buyers may tend to approach a seller with aggressive bargaining tactics, suspicion, and non-cooperative strategies. Focusing on these tactics leaves a negotiator vulnerable to the possibility of overlooking creative and integrative deals.

Whereas it is true that negotiation scripts can hijack a negotiator's bandwidth and reduce the quality of the negotiated outcome, these scripts can also be useful. When information is scarce or unavailable, scripts help negotiators prepare for a given type of negotiation situation. However, we consider script hijack to have occurred when a nego-tiation script is relied upon to a degree that biases perception of a negotiation situation in a way that reduces the likelihood of recognizing when useful but script-inconsistent tactics or strategies could have been used. Returning to the used-car example, on average it is useful to go into a used-car negotiation with a distributive mindset; however, not all used-car negotiations fit this script. These negotiations sometimes involve a number of issues (for example, price, payment plan, delivery method, maintenance, or upgrades) that can be traded off to create value. In this situation, over-adherence to a used-car negotiation script may blind the negotiator to the possibility of creating value.

The power of negotiation scripts is illustrated in research by Curhan et al. (2008). In one study, participants were engaged in a hypothetical employment negotiation. Negotiation dyads were led to believe that they were from either an egalitarian organi-zation (that is, one that values relationships) or from a hierarchical organization (that is, one that values economic self-interest). They found that those who negotiated in an egalitarian context created more relational capital and realized less economic efficiency than those in a hierarchical context. This study demonstrates how the activation of negotiation scripts can guide negotiators' behaviors toward script-consistent outcomes.

In this section we discussed the dually adaptive and limiting nature of negotiation scripts. In the next section we will discuss the conditions under which script-hijack is most likely to occur.

Strong Situations Hijack Negotiations

A primary determinant of script hijack is the strength of the negotiation situation. Strong situations are those in which everyone has the same expectations about what con-stitutes appropriate behavior (Mischel, 1977). In these situations, individual differences and preferences are overshadowed by normative expectations. These are in contrast to weak situations, where normatively appropriate behavior is more ambiguous. Strong situations tend to increase script hijack because negotiators overly rely on relevant nego-tiation scripts. This reduces their ability to be dynamic and increases the likelihood that they will fail to use a valuable, but script-inconsistent, strategy or tactic—in other words, it reduces negotiator bandwidth.

A salient example of a strong situation is in negotiations where "gender" negotiation scripts become activated, such as in competitive bargaining situations. According to

gender scripts, men are assertive bargainers focused on claiming value and women are soft bargainers focused on relationships (Kray et al., 2001). Indeed, Bowles et al. (2005) found that in competitive bargaining situations with ambiguous pay structures, women underperformed their male counterparts. They found that women had lower expectations about how much value they could claim and subsequently claimed less value than their male counterparts. For these women, negotiation scripts regarding gender (men are hard bargainers, women are soft bargainers) hijacked their strategies and led them to claim less value.

If strong situations hijack negotiations, then reducing the strength of the situation should reduce the impact of script hijack. This is exactly what Bowles and colleagues (2005) found. In their study, the strength of the gender negotiation script was reduced by removing the ambiguity around the pay structure, which made bargaining more straightforward and less gender-relevant. This eliminated the gender differences in expected performance and actual performance. Presumably, in this weakened situation, reliance on gender scripts was reduced, which allowed women to perceive a wider range of negotiation behaviors as appropriate.

Another example of a strong situation involves negotiations that involve accountability to constituents. Negotiators who represent a group, to whom they must justify their bargaining outcomes, negotiate more assertively and have more difficulty reaching compromise agreements than those who are less accountable to a group (Pruitt, 1981). In these situations, representing constituents appears to activate a negotiation script of "the tough representative" whereby negotiators think they must appear strong and uncompromising in order to please their constituents, who presumably value these qualities (Tetlock, 1985).

Strong situations can facilitate script hijack, but what makes a negotiation situation strong or weak? A number of factors contribute to the strength of the situation and predict script hijack. In the next two sections we will discuss two sources of strong situations: social norms and environmental cues.

Social Norms

Social norms often contribute to strong situations and increase the likelihood of script hijack. By social norms, we mean the rules and standards that implicitly or explicitly guide social behavior (Cialdini and Trost, 1998). We suggest that, in specific contexts, social norms activate negotiation scripts, and guide our perceptions of how we think we should behave in those situations. For example, in the context of interracial interactions, Whites experience interracial interaction with Black counterparts as stressful and awkward (Richeson and Shelton, 2007). In these situations, social norms evoke scripts that guide what is perceived to be appropriate behavior. For example, Whites often activate the "colorblindness" script, in which Whites regulate their appearance so as to not look prejudiced. They avoid talking about race and do not acknowledge differences (Apfelbaum et al., 2008). These scripts have the potential to be destructive in negotiation contexts. Adherence to these scripts can be cognitively depleting for both interaction partners (Holoien and Shelton, 2011; Richeson and Trawalter, 2005) and may reduce the quality of the negotiation overall. Whites in interracial interactions have been associated with a prevention focus (Trawalter and Richeson, 2006), and prevention-focused nego-

tiators have been found to create and claim less value in negotiations than those with a promotion focus (Galinsky et al., 2005). Also, these scripts might limit the scope of the issues that can be negotiated as Whites might avoid talking about issues that have to do with race or class differences (Apfelbaum et al., 2008). In this section we discussed the origins of script hijack. Social norms shape negotiators' expectations and create strong situations that guide their behavior. Another question that remains is how these negotiation scripts become active in the first place. In the next section we discuss how environmental cues activate negotiation scripts.

The Power of Labels

Labels, or contextual cues in one's environment, can activate negotiation scripts. Because of this, labels are powerful. Labels exert immense influence on our behavior. This happens both inside and outside of our awareness. A number of studies have demonstrated this principle using the prisoner's dilemma. Liberman et al. (2004) engaged participants in a multi-round prisoner's dilemma game. For half of the participants the game was labeled the "Wall Street" game and for the others it was labeled the "Community" game. The researchers found significantly more cooperation among those playing the Community game than among those playing the Wall Street game, even though all participants were playing the same game. Presumably, the labels activated different negotiation scripts for those involved. Those playing the Wall Street game followed a negotiation script consistent with self-interested, competitive bargaining and were more likely to see the value in defecting. On the other hand, those playing the Community game were following a script involving other-focused thinking and cooperation. A number of other studies found similarly powerful results of labeling in the prisoner's dilemma. Zhong et al. (2007) found that simply putting descriptive labels (for example, cooperator, defector) on the potential moves was enough to increase cooperation compared to a group who played the same game without labels. It is possible that these labels invoked negotiation scripts involving fairness, which were not activated in those who played the game without labels. Finally, another study found that changing the context of the prisoner's dilemma from "two prisoners in interrogation rooms" to "two drivers in their cars" dramatically increases cooperation (Kümmerli et al., 2007). In each of these studies, the labels used to describe the prisoner's dilemma game powerfully influenced negotiators' decisions.

Outside the context of economic games, Small et al. (2007) investigated the power of labels in a salary negotiation. Specifically, they looked at the propensity of men and women to negotiate a salary. Their initial studies found that men are more likely to initiate a salary negotiation than women when doing so was called "negotiating." However, they found that men and women were equally likely to negotiate a salary when doing so was called "asking." Presumably, the label "negotiation" activated the gender negotiation script, which involves women being less assertive. However, the label "ask" did not activate this script, which allowed the women in the "ask" condition to be less restricted in their behaviors.

Preventing and Counteracting Script Hijack

The line between following a negotiation script and falling prey to script hijack is a fine one. Going into a competitive negotiation with expectations for competition can help

negotiators prepare appropriate tactics and counterstrategies. However, adhering too closely to a competitive negotiation script can blind negotiators to integrative opportunities. In trying to optimize the value of a negotiation script while preventing script hijack, there are two issues to consider. The first is preventing strong situations from hijacking *your own* behavior in a negotiation. The second is knowing how to manage a situation in which scripts may already be guiding the decisions of others.

First, negotiators try to prevent negotiation scripts from hijacking their own perceptions of a negotiation. Factors that reduce the strength of the situation or increase the agency of the person can reduce reliance on negotiation scripts. Returning to Bowles and colleagues (2005), we remember that when ambiguity around economic incentives was eliminated, gender script activation was reduced, and gender scripts did not exert influence. Another factor that can reduce the strength of the situation involves feelings of power (Galinsky et al., 2008a). In one study, negotiators were primed with high or low power and then negotiated with a counterpart who had either a competitive or a cooperative reputation. Whereas those primed with low power were more likely to base their negotiation strategies on the reputation of the other party, those primed with high power were more likely to base their strategies on their own social-value orientations. This research suggests the possibility that reducing the strength of the situation, or increasing reliance on internal cues, could reduce reliance on negotiation scripts as well; however, further exploration is warranted.

The second challenge involves knowing how to manage a situation in which scripts are already active. One prescription for counteracting the effects of script hijack is knowing when to adhere to and when to deviate from a negotiation script. For example, when gender negotiation scripts are active, women can be penalized for being too assertive (Bowles et al., 2007). These authors found that when women initiate a negotiation they are perceived as less nice and more demanding than their male counterparts who initiate a negotiation. Presumably this is because deviating from a negotiation script amplifies the negative aspects of these behaviors. Imagine a young, entry-level woman who is tasked with negotiating with upper management, who are typically older men. In such negotiation situations, where gender scripts are active, it may be necessary for a woman to build credibility and perceptions of competence before she can break gender roles without being penalized.

Summary

To summarize, in this section we introduced the script hijack effect, or the tendency for negotiators to over rely on a script when in a negotiation. Next, we described in more detail the role of negotiation scripts in organizing the way we perceive information and guide our behaviors and decisions. Then we discussed two sources of negotiation scripts, social norms and stereotypes, and the power of labels to evoke these scripts. Finally we discussed how to mitigate script hijack. The concept of script hijack suggests that increasing negotiation bandwidth and learning to be a more effective negotiator does not entail improving personal skills and abilities alone, but also involves being aware of the situation and knowing when strong situations might be hijacking your bandwidth.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we've considered three ways in which negotiators limit their ability to negotiate effectively. We described these errors as: (1) domain myopia, or the tendency for negotiators to fail to see meaningful parallels across negotiation situations that might appear different on the surface, but have meaningful underlying similarities; (2) the self-preoccupation effect, or the tendency for negotiators to become so self-preoccupied that they fail to learn from others; and (3) the script hijack effect, or the tendency for situations to be so powerful that a stereotyped sequence of behaviors is indicated that may be different from what a negotiator may feel is optimal.

Speaking more broadly about learning in negotiation, our fundamental thesis is that there are two concerns a negotiator should have: the first is whether the negotiator possesses the requisite skillset needed to negotiate. The second is whether the negotiator can accurately recognize when to apply a given skill. Most previous research has focused on the first question and indeed a list of negotiator shortcomings and biases have pervaded the literature for decades. Our point of departure is downstream of negotiator skill acquisition and thus, we focus on the appropriate deployment of skills. Errors of bandwidth may occur because negotiators do not make use of their own experiences across situations (domain myopia), or fail to make use of others' experiences because they are self-preoccupied, or because they are overwhelmed by situational norms (script hijack).

We have suggested ways that negotiators may improve their bandwidth. It is interesting to note that professionals and experts in their chosen domains are able to derive abstractions and rules and in this sense have a higher vantage point. Whereas most business people who negotiate everyday would be justified in calling themselves experts, if we were to simply measure the hours put into negotiation, these business people often consider themselves novices, despite years of negotiating.

Negotiators should consider ways to prevent these biases from occurring in the first place. In the absence of employing pedagogical models to increase a negotiator's bandwidth, the negotiator could simply pay attention to whether they are exploring beyond the surface of their negotiation, whether they are becoming too emotionally embroiled in their situation, and whether they fall prey to a script that constrains their ability to think and act dynamically.

In this chapter, we've argued that cognitive and emotional principles conspire to thwart effective learning and we have pointed out ways to overcome or at least mitigate these shortcomings.

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