This chapter argues for expanding our research focus in the field of bargaining and negotiation. The vast majority of research in the field (as reflected in this handbook) examines the bargaining process as it unfolds between the parties. Leigh Thompson, Brian Lucas, and Erika Richardson argue that more attention needs to be paid to events that lead up to the time of the negotiation and following the negotiation’s conclusion. This chapter thus expands our view of what bargaining research can and should look like in the future.

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The prolific field of negotiation has built a strong and impressive compendium of research studies. The findings represent a mix of both straightforward results (e.g.,
setting high aspirations leads to better outcomes; Neale and Bazerman, 1985; Northcraft, Neale, and Early, 1994) as well as nonintuitive findings (e.g., perspective taking, but not empathy, leads to better negotiated outcomes, Galinsky, Maddux, Gillin, and White, 2008). We argue that the impressive compendium of negotiation research studies has directly benefited from three pivotal factors: a multidisciplinary theoretical history, a strong methodological paradigm, and a connected community of scholars. In this chapter, we highlight the dominant methodological paradigm in negotiation research and ultimately argue that scholars have been narrowly mining only one aspect of the complex process of negotiation. We segment the scholarly study of negotiation into what we refer to as upstream, midstream, and downstream research, and we argue that we have been comfortably sitting midstream for several decades and that it behooves the field to begin to explore both upstream and downstream.

Historically, organizational behaviorists and social psychologists who study negotiation willingly embraced the induced-preference paradigm model, borrowed from economics, in which negotiators are given roles and an incentive structure and then set off to negotiate. The key dependent measures of joint profit and individual profit have been the mainstays of negotiation research. In addition, the paradigm, first empirically introduced by Kelley (1966) and later refined by others (cf. Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993; Thompson and Hastie, 1990), as well as other scorable tasks, have provided a meaningful and engaging way by which we analyze the “dance” (the process) and the outcomes of negotiation. Recently, scholars have widened the net of salient outcomes of negotiation to include less economically grounded concepts, such as satisfaction, the willingness to negotiate again with the counterparty, reputation, and trust. This strategic expansion of negotiated outcomes has led to some exciting insights. For example, Bowles, Babcock, and McGinn (2005) suggested that defined economic preference models may mute naturally occurring gender effects in a negotiation. In other words, if participants are constrained to a set of economic preferences in a negotiation simulation, they will behave more like the role and less like themselves. Curhan (2006) similarly argued for a focus on more subjective negotiation measures, rather than economic metrics. The subjective value inventory (SVI) questionnaire was designed to address social psychological negotiation outcomes, related to the self, negotiation process, and the relationship of the negotiators. In the following sections, we further identify, describe, and explore these areas and suggest potential research opportunities.

**Upstream, Midstream, and Downstream Research**

In this chapter, we distinguish three different research vantage points in negotiation, which we refer to as upstream, midstream, and downstream research. Upstream research refers to the study of all the events that can occur leading up
to the time of actual negotiation, for example, the act of preparing for negotiation, choosing a team, determining a reservation price and BATNA, and researching the other party’s interests. Midstream research refers to the actual process of negotiation. Commonly referred to as the “dance of negotiation” (cf. Raiffa, 1982), it is the study of negotiators in the heat of actual negotiation up to and including the point of agreement and the nature of settlement that is or is not reached. Downstream research refers to what happens in the minutes, hours, weeks, days, and years following the conclusion of a negotiation (e.g., commitment to the contents of a deal, feelings of regret or elation, future interactions between the negotiators). We argue that the field has been largely, but certainly not exclusively, dominated by midstream research. Thus future directions involve expanding our view of negotiation.

Because we know a lot about the midstream, we will not provide an extensive review of this research. Briefly, studies of opening offers and anchoring are mainstays of the midstream research tradition (cf. Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001). The field arguably had its modern debut with the focus on framing effects (Bazerman and Neale, 1982; Neale, Huber, and Northcraft, 1987) and, more recently, visual access (Carnevale, 1986; Drolet and Morris, 2000; Swaab and Swaab, 2009), regulatory focus (Appelt and Higgins, 2010; Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, and Mussweiler, 2005), labeling (Liberman, Samuels, and Ross, 2004), perspective taking (Neale and Bazerman, 1983; Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001; Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin and White, 2008) and gender (Bowles, Babcock, and McGinn, 2005; Kray, Thompson and Galinsky, 2001). In addition to studying cognitive factors, midstream research has historically focused on “truly social” factors, such as friendships and relationships (e.g., Fry, Firestone, Williams, 1983; Thompson, Peterson, and Brodt, 1996; Amanatullah, Morris, and Curhan, 2008). One of the youngest children of midstream research, namely, emotions and moods, has also worked its way in the focus of study (Overbeck, Neale, Govan, 2010; Van Kleef, and De Dreu, 2010).

We know a great deal about what happens when people sit across the table in a finite-horizon bargaining game and conclude by completing a contract agreement. However, we do not know much about how the negotiators got there nor what happens afterward. Such research would not be disjointed from midstream research but may involve a focus on different disciplinary theories. In this chapter, we draw on current and possible research to outline a course of study for upstream and downstream research.

**Upstream research**

Upstream research occurs prior to the point at which a negotiator is considering negotiation or is anticipating a negotiation. Whereas it is methodologically convenient to allot a finite amount of time for negotiators to receive their assigned roles,
study them, and prepare a strategy, this is hardly reflective of the actual practice of negotiation. In this section, we outline six areas of potentially fruitful upstream research: negotiability, negotiation threshold, preparation competency, choosing a team, networks, and reputation.

**Negotiability**

We use the term *negotiability* to refer to the extent to which a person realizes that a situation is negotiable. Recent studies on gender and negotiation have suggested that, under some conditions, women might not consider a situation to be negotiable. We use the term *negotiator readiness* to refer to the extent that a person might feel comfortable negotiating in a variety of contexts and situations (ranging from a used car lot to a daycare center to a job). Research in this part of the stream would focus on the phenomena of when a person first realizes that a situation is negotiable and whether she believes she has the skills to initiate negotiations.

It is also interesting to speculate that negotiator readiness might be culturally determined or predicted by socioeconomic factors. For example, in many cultures it is socially acceptable to bargain with vendors and stores, yet in other cultures, bargaining in a store may appear uncouth (Volkema and Fleck, 2010). In a similar vein, many negotiable items are germane to individuals of a particular socioeconomic status. For example, individuals from a different socioeconomic status who may not have owned a home or obtained a job with a salary, rather than an hourly wage, may not recognize when these items are negotiable. Future research should focus on identifying demographic factors and individual characteristics in an attempt to describe and predict an individual’s vision of what is negotiable. We may find that individuals show more negotiator readiness in familiar contexts, that is, a person of low socioeconomic status may readily negotiate at local produce markets or used car dealerships, whereas individuals with higher socioeconomic status may feel more comfortable at art auctions or in business deals.

**Negotiation Threshold**

We use the term *negotiation threshold* to refer to the extent to which a person desires to invest the time and energy into negotiation. In other words, the question is not whether a situation is negotiable, rather whether a situation is worth negotiating. There are at least two considerations: One is economic (i.e., is it worth my time haggling for a discount in Nordstrom if I am trying to make it to the business meeting?), and the other is normative or appropriate (i.e., will I be regarded as pushy or inappropriate if I bring this up now?). There are clues from social cognition that might inform how negotiators decide to negotiate, even once they recognize that
the exchange is in a domain that is negotiable. One factor may be power. Magee, Galinsky, and Gruenfeld (2007) found that, compared to low-power individuals, high-power individuals are more likely to initiate a negotiation. High-power individuals were more likely to initiate negotiations over the price of a new car and for the upgrade of an airline voucher. Once the negotiation was initiated, high-power negotiators were also more likely to make the first offer. Thus, power may mediate the point at which a person is willing to advance any aspect of a dispute.

Further, recent research on assertiveness may be linked to willingness to initiate negotiations. Assertiveness expectancies, or beliefs about the consequences of assertiveness in a given context, explain the level of assertiveness an individual shows in that context (Ames, 2008). Thus, a negotiator’s expectancies about specific negotiation contexts may affect the negotiation threshold. Gender differences may also affect willingness to negotiate. When women initiate a negotiation, they are penalized for breaking gender stereotypes, whereas men are not (Bowles, Babcock, and Lai, 2007). Future research on negotiation threshold might focus on the relative economic versus subjective considerations that a negotiator mulls when assessing whether or not to negotiate. It might be that negotiators who lack assertiveness are unwilling to admit that and so justify their decision to not negotiate by citing economic factors. Further, self-efficacy may impact individual decision to negotiate. If people believe that their efforts to secure a better-negotiated agreement will be futile, they may not waste time in negotiating the agreement.

**Preparation Competency**

As much as negotiation scholars admonish their students to prepare for negotiation, when it comes to research, we know little about how people actually prepare. We identify three levels of preparation that merit further investigation: the self, the issues, and the context.

Self-preparation research involves exploring how individuals prepare themselves to negotiate. One factor that has been investigated is implicit beliefs about negotiation skills. Negotiators who believe negotiation skills are malleable (incremental theorists) tend to reach better negotiation outcomes than those who believe negotiation skills are fixed (entity theorists), because the incrementalists are able to overcome initial setbacks in the negotiation (Kray and Haselhuhn, 2007). Other research shows that positive expectations may create self-fulfilling prophesies. In Arab-Israeli conflict simulations, negotiators who were told that previous dyads were “successful” were more likely to accept “final proposals” as compared to consistently rejecting proposals (Liberman, Anderson, and Ross, 2010). Similarly, self-efficacy affects negotiators’ performance, particularly when situations are more ambiguous (Miles and LaSalle, 2008). Another important factor in self-preparation is prenegotiation stress. O’Connor, Arnold, and Maurizio (2010) found that
negotiators who perceive a negotiation as a threat, rather than a challenge, experience greater levels of prernegotiation stress, which leads to lower-quality outcomes.

Task preparation involves collecting and analyzing information relevant to the negotiation (e.g., in a real estate negotiation, a negotiator might obtain comparables). Such preparation can include accessing one’s own preferences, determining a BATNA, and considering strategic decisions such as who should make the first offer. This also involves gathering information about the other party. In this area, Sinaceur’s (2010) investigation of suspicion and distrust is one example of this, because being suspicious of an opponent leads to greater information search and better outcomes than distrust does. However, the positive effects of preparation may come with a caveat. Whereas overpreparation in regard to one’s own position is typically considered beneficial, too much preparation in regard to the other party may actually be detrimental. Hyperpreparation may crystallize expectations of the counterparty and consequently make the negotiator overconfident about her opponent’s position (and presumably less flexible; see Neale and Bazerman, 1982). Negotiators often make assumptions about their negotiation counterparts that may lead to false attributions and affect the way in which we proceed with the negotiation (Morris, Larrick, and Sue, 1999).

A final aspect of negotiation preparation is choosing a context for the negotiation, such as where to meet and under what conditions. Context preparation refers to the strategic decision to construct a favorable physical environment for the negotiation. Research outside the domain of negotiations has demonstrated the signaling effects of context. Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli, and Morris (2002) demonstrated the power of office layouts to affect personality judgments, and numerous studies have documented the behavioral influence of minor changes to a decision environment (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). It may be that members of indirect-communication cultures may be more thoughtful and deliberate in regard to choosing context than members of direct-communication cultures. Additionally, choosing the context may afford the negotiator more power and/or status in the negotiation. Prior research on posture and positioning (Huang, Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Guillory, 2010) suggests that expansive postures can prime power in individuals. Negotiators who predetermine their context, and also their posture, may have negotiator advantage over their counterparts.

Future research in this area might consider how negotiators prepare as a key dependent measure. Preparation effectiveness might be meaningfully quantified to index the degree to which negotiators understand the sensitivity among issues and the extent to which they have considered possible alternatives. For self-preparation, we should explore the ways in which different preparation styles contribute to successful outcomes in a variety of negotiation contexts. In terms of task preparation, it is useful to consider the degree to which prior information about one’s negotiation opponent may lead negotiators to mistakenly adopt a rigid negotiation strategy. For context preparation, researchers should define the elements of an environment that are conducive to beneficial agreements. For example, a
The negotiator’s choice of an opulent negotiation environment may invoke sentiments of wealth, which in turn, may make the counterparty more inclined to be aggressive in requesting money from the negotiator.

Choosing a Team

The study of teams has exploded in negotiation research (cf. Thompson, Peterson, and Brodt, 1996; Peterson and Thompson, 1997; Beersma and De Dreu, 2002; Weingart, Bennett, and Brett, 1993). Almost without exception, the team is considered an independent variable or causal factor. Another topic of upstream research would focus on how negotiators choose and select team members. Some work suggests that negotiators may err on side of selecting teams that are too homogenous or too large and that they fail to consider the amount of process loss that occurs in large teams (for a review, see Thompson, 2011). Other work suggests that negotiators may err in their identification of homogeneity, being overly influenced by superficial similarity among team members and failing to understand deep or structural similarity (Phillips and Loyd, 2006). In the distributed information group paradigm, members of teams do not all have the same information, and the challenge is to effectively pool the information (Stasser and Stewart, 1992). When group members are dissimilar to one another, they are more likely to discuss information that is unique and are better able to identify hidden profiles (Phillips and Loyd, 2006). The question of how negotiation teams resolve differing preferences across issues may be affected by team composition. The question of hidden profiles in negotiation, or superior negotiation outcomes that are hidden by incomplete information, may be relevant to the study of nonobvious compatible issues or logrolling issues. It is useful to imagine negotiation teams composed of members who are not fully apprised of the group’s preferences at least at the outset. When preferences are initially known by all members, groups tend to converge on and support whichever preference is advocated by the majority (Hastie and Kameda, 2005). When this tendency leaves unique information unattended to, it often results in suboptimal outcomes (Stasser and Stewart, 1992).

Future research in team selection might integrate research on hidden profiles with negotiator effectiveness. For example, research might address whether a team of superficially homogenous people are more or less effective in terms of preparation than a team of superficially heterogeneous people, holding constant the underlying structure of the task. Team members might be given different but complementary information about the negotiation task.

Additionally, research in this vein could look at how team members are selected. Certain traits or competencies may afford a negotiator a reputation as a strong team member, whereas other traits could be viewed as being relatively weak. This line of research would identify these traits and put forth several guidelines in regard to how negotiators can best represent themselves as a productive member of a negotiation team.
Networks

Negotiation research has extensively explored the question of friendship and relationships at the negotiation table, as well as the question of how expected future interaction with another affects negotiation (cf. Ben-Yoav and Pruitt, 1984). However, for the most part, negotiation research has remained at the dyadic, first-hand level and has not examined how negotiators might be affected by the mere knowledge that someone is in their network or explored degrees of network separation as a causal factor. Negotiation networks refer to how people are interrelated through their membership in a given social-organizational domain. Once someone is identified as an ingroup member they are given preferential treatment over those who are seen as outgroup members (Kramer and Brewer, 1984). At the negotiation table, the direct implication of this statement is that negotiators give preference to their own team.

There are two issues to be considered. First, beyond negotiators’ immediate team, negotiators must consider all aligned parties and how a negotiated agreement will impact those not at the table. Second, beyond negotiators’ immediate interests, negotiators must again consider the implications of an agreement and the impact it could have through the network. Interestingly, the latter consideration will sometimes make it necessary for negotiators to have their opponents’ interests in mind, depending on how the agreement is expected to resonate with the network.

Future research in this area might examine how highly centralized negotiators prepare differently (perhaps more effectively) than less-well-centralized negotiators, holding constant the nature of the task. The hypothesis would be that highly centralized negotiators are able to better prepare for negotiations.

Reputations and Impression Management

Reputations and impression management are a distinct aspect of preparation effectiveness that deals with socially constructed information. Negotiators’ reputations contain valuable information for the perceiver and, consequently, must be managed from the perspective of the perceiver. Important considerations include: how reputation information is utilized in a negotiation and how or if negotiators actively manage their reputations (impression management). Viewed in this sense, reputations and impression management are arguably topics that affect upstream as well as downstream negotiators. For example, while preparing for a negotiation, a person might do a Facebook search and learn reputational information about a counterparty. Similarly, following a negotiation, a person will form an impression of a counterparty and perhaps post it on Facebook.

Research with economic games demonstrates that bargainers attend to the social information transmitted by their actions and sometimes use it in strategic ways. Research using a repeated ultimatum game paradigm with incomplete information found a sharp increase in deception when bargainers’ information
remained private (Boles, Croson, and Murnighan, 2000), when deception could not tarnish the reputation. Some of the consequences of reputations have also been investigated. For example, the most detrimental effects of cheap talk in bargaining situations are the potential downstream consequences that a reputation for lies and threats have on future interactions (Croson, Boles, and Murnighan, 2003). A consequence of reputations for negotiators is that the other party can prepare for how they expect a negotiator to behave (Glick and Croson, 2001). For example, a strategy of making excessively high starting offers will not be effective against a counterparty who knows you have a reputation for making such offers.

Additionally, Tinsley, O’Conner, and Sullivan (2002) demonstrate the negative effects of a distributive reputation. Specifically, more distributive bargaining tactics were used against bargainers with distributive reputations than those with no reputations. Recently, Anderson and Shirako (2008) found that individuals who were better connected in their communities were more likely to gain a reputation—whether favorable or not. It may be that reputation information guides expectations that lead to self-fulfilling prophesies, thus the effects occur online. Impression management is the process by which people control the impressions others form of them (Leary and Kowalski, 1990). In negotiations, this is accomplished by considering the other parties’ expectations and values and behaving in a way consistent with the reputation you want to project.

The nature of impression management in negotiations is relatively unexplored and is a good avenue for future research. Impression management in negotiations could potentially be utilized in two different ways. First, negotiators can actively shape others’ impressions of them (e.g., the tall and stern-looking man acts overly warm to mitigate feelings of threat). Impression management may be useful as a strategic tool. Awareness of how one’s behavior is viewed by the other party can be valuable knowledge in strategically guiding future behavior (e.g., the card player who plays conservatively all game in order to successfully bluff a big hand at the end of the night).

Upstream research has been largely ignored or at least highly controlled by current negotiation research paradigms. In this section, we argued that the realization that negotiation is an option, the decision to negotiate, preparation, and reputational concerns constitute meaningful effects to study in negotiation. In realistic situations, no one announces that a negotiation will begin and that a conclusion is expected at a given time.

**Downstream research**

Downstream research illuminates what occurs after the negotiation, after the point at which negotiators have either consummated a deal or have declared an impasse. In most cases, researchers are primarily interested in the nature of the agreement
reached. Recently, researchers have attempted to expand not only the scope of postnegotiation questions but also the time frame (Curhan, Elfenbein, and Xu, 2006; Mannix, Tinsley, and Bazerman, 1995). We outline four downstream areas: commitment, learning and insight, rebound/recovery, and collateral damage.

**Commitment**

It has been implicitly assumed that if negotiators have voluntarily reached a mutual agreement that their intention is to honor that agreement. However, one glance at the actual world of negotiation immediately calls such commitment into question. For example, consider the Facebook court settlement, as popularized in the recent movie, *The Social Network*. The Winkelvoss twins accepted the terms but then, months later, attempted to renegotiate because they regarded the settlement to be unfair. Thus, the question of whether negotiators mull the terms of negotiation and attempt to either seek social validation that they reached an admirable settlement or, conversely, whether they were hoodwinked may strongly determine whether negotiated agreements are viable.

Malhotra (in press) suggests that contracts are an essential piece of the negotiated agreement, especially in organizational or multiparty negotiations in which the negotiators who form the agreement and the individuals who execute the terms of the agreement are often not the same people. Contracts may signal low expectations for a relationship (Chou, Halevy, in Murnighan, in press). Thus, a contract written at the present time may hurt the relationship later. Additionally, binding contracts cause trust to be attributed to the situation, whereas nonbinding contracts result in trust attributions to the person (Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002). Contracts may act as “sanctioning systems” that signal to negotiators to expect low levels of trust (Mulder, van Dijk, De Cremer, and Wilke, 2006). More satisfied negotiators may be more committed to the settlement and prove a greater prospect for future interaction. Research on retrospective judgments suggests two critical points of the negotiation that could determine relationship satisfaction: the peak moment of conflict intensity and the level of conflict experienced at the end of the negotiation (Redelmeier and Kahneman, 1996). This work suggests that, when building relationships among negotiators, multiple small gaffes may have less of an impact than big mistakes and that a positive finish may overshadow a rough start.

Future research in this area might focus on the pattern of emotion and storytelling that negotiators construct after they leave the negotiation table. For example, it may be that a story constructed for one type of interchange (e.g., one’s spouse) might lead to a different set of postnegotiation emotions than a story (about the same negotiation) recounted to a lawyer colleague. Research could also account for postnegotiation remorse. For example, regret concerning the negotiated agreement could mediate the degree to which negotiators initiate postnegotiation settlements or shirk their obligations.
Learning and Insight

One area of negotiation research that has gone downstream is the burgeoning literature on learning. The key questions in this area concern the extent to which negotiators are able to transfer learnings and insights from one negotiation situation to another (i.e., Gentner, Lowenstein, Thompson, and Forbus, 2009; Kray, Galinsky, and Markman, 2009). The typical transfer of learning paradigm introduces a key negotiation concept at time one and then provides an opportunity to use the key concept at time two. We say that learning occurs when the negotiator successfully uses the key concept at time two. Analogical reasoning (i.e., actively comparing two or more cases that have the same underlying, deep structure) increases negotiators’ ability to problem solve and overcome impasse (Thompson, Gentner, and Loewenstein, 2000; Spector, 1995). Additionally, use of analogical transfer as a training tool increases negotiators’ ability to detect underlying issues and negotiate more profitable deals (Moran, Bereby-Meyer, and Bazerman, 2008; Thompson, Gentner, and Loewenstein, 2000). However, as a general rule, individuals are generally not adept at transferring knowledge (Gick and Holyoak, 1980), and thus, the question of how to enhance negotiators’ ability to learn through analogical transfer is key. Affect may play a role in analogical transfer. Affect attached to a specific memory, an affective tag, helps to preserve that memory by increasing the number of routes to retrieval (Damasio, 1994; Higgins, 1996). Thus, attaching personal meaning to cases may facilitate learning and knowledge transfer. Learning also emphasizes the importance of debriefing negotiators. Debriefings can be used as a way to manage “cognitive spillover,” or the remembering of mundane facts (i.e., my opponent was wearing black shoes) instead of the key details (i.e., I gained more profit when I started exploring issues) of a negotiation experience.

Future research might explore the ability of negotiators to compare stories with colleagues and counterparties so as to enhance learning. Heretofore, the research on analogical learning has been largely intrapersonal, and it may be worthwhile exploring the interpersonal knowledge transfer. Future research may also determine the type of affect that enhances learning in negotiation. For example, anger may impede the process of knowledge transfer, whereas happiness may facilitate it.

Rebound/Recovery

Agreement rebound refers to how negotiators deal with or adjust their own self-perceptions after a negotiation. This self-knowledge is important in that it allows negotiators to recognize their habits, relatively automatic behaviors that link their goals to their actions (Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2000). O’Connor, Arnold, and Burris (2005) first demonstrated the role of habits in negotiations. They found that negotiators’ bargaining histories tend to affect their future performance. For example, negotiators who reach an impasse in a negotiation are more likely to
reach an impasse on a subsequent negotiation than those who reached an agreement. Negotiators’ behavioral tendencies, or habits, mediate this relationship. An important implication of this finding is that preparation for a negotiation may not begin when the negotiator first identifies a negotiation situation. Because preparation may involve identifying and modifying habits, it may begin directly after the negotiator concludes a previous negotiation.

Another question concerns the development of self-identity. At what point, do people consider themselves to be negotiators? Research on identity theory suggests that people have a need to both feel that they are similar to others but that also they are distinctive. Considering oneself to be a proficient negotiator might serve identity needs for organizational actors.

Further research on habits in negotiations could have a far-reaching impact for improving negotiation strategies. For example, Mannix, Tinsley, and Bazerman (1995) concluded that negotiators tend to fail at recognizing integrative, long-term solutions when short-term gains are met. It is possible that retraining of habits could help negotiators to overcome such detrimental tendencies. Further research on self-identity could explore the types of experiences that best lead individuals to view themselves as negotiators. For example, highly stylized negotiations, such as buying a car or house might lead people to see themselves as negotiators, more so that even more complex negotiations, such as hiring child care or negotiating job responsibilities.

**Collateral Damage**

*Collateral damage* is damage that is unintended or incidental to the intended outcome. In the context of a negotiation, a negotiator may discover facts that she or he might have preferred not to know. For example, a negotiator might learn after a successful but one-sided negotiation that her counterpart had lost his or her job or been removed from promotion opportunities. This downstream research would focus on the emotions, such as guilt or remorse, experienced by negotiators after they leave the negotiation table.

An interesting avenue of research is how negotiators cope with these unwanted emotions and how this can impact their future behavior. For example, certain coping strategies have information-biasing effects (Carver, Scheier, and Weintraub, 1989), such as the positive reinterpretation of events or threat-induced attentional myopia. The use of such coping strategies may lead to decision biases or inaccurate interpretations of events. The type of coping strategy chosen will surely affect the impact of this “emotional baggage” on the negotiation.

We know little about how negotiators’ self-views and perceptions develop and change as they leave the negotiation table. No doubt external information may affect the negotiation “fallout” but also internal musings and spontaneous recounting of the previous experience may affect how one feels about a past negotiation.
Conclusion

As a field, negotiation scholars have built an impressive body of knowledge and research findings about the midstream or the heat of negotiation. However, the question of how negotiators get to the negotiation table in the first place is relatively uncharted territory. Similarly, our understanding of what happens after negotiators shake hands is also relatively unexplored. By expanding our research focus to upstream and downstream research, we offer the possibility of new research vistas. Extending research on the upstream and downstream of negotiations will strengthen our understanding of not only how negotiators operate but whether and when and will highlight potentially unanticipated consequences of negotiation that were previously unexplored.

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